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Severance Deed Waivers of the
Surface Estate's Right to Subjacent
Support as a Basis for Longwall
Mining Rights
As coal prices deflated in the 1980s, producers began looking
for more efficient methods of mining. Coupled with this trend
was the increasing dominance of large coal companies who could
afford to install enormous longwall mining systems, capable of
producing greater quantities of coal with lower labor costs. The
longwall system, by its nature, collapses the mine roof as it
retrieves the coal, creating an immediate subsidence of surface
land and overlying strata. While the more commonly used room
and pillar mining method also creates subsidence, pillars of coal
and roofing timbers often support the mine roof for years, so
damage to the surface owners' property is less obvious.
Increased use of longwall mining systems has created a flurry
of lawsuits that stand to create a new rule of law with regard
to deed waivers of subjacent support.' In a series of cases from
Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virginia, 2 the rule has emerged that if
a severance deed contains an express waiver of surface support,
the mineral estate owner has the right to use the longwall mining
method. Surface owner plaintiffs in these cases have attempted
to borrow an argument frequently used with regard to surface
mining: that the waiver should not be enforced for mining
methods not in existence when the severance was made since
such methods would have been outside the contemplation of the
3
parties to the original severance.

Ball v. Island Creek Coal Co., 722 F. Supp. 1370 (W.D. Va. 1989).
2 Culp v. Consolidated Pennsylvania Coal Co., No. 8193 (W.D. Pa. May 4,

1989); Porter v. Consolidation Coal Co., No. 86-1396, slip op. (W.D. Pa. August 18,
1988); aff'd, 870 F.2d 651 (3rd Cir. 1989); Wells v. American Electric Power Co., No.
441, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. July 29, 1988).
1 Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968); Peabody Coal
Co. v. P.C. Pasco, 452 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1971). The same position has been affirmed
by the federal courts in Watson- v. Kenlick Coal Co., 498 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1012 (1975).
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As the cases from Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virginia demonstrate, such an argument has enjoyed less success for surface
owner plaintiffs whose land is being mined by the longwall
method than a similar argument used against strip mining. In
these decisions the courts have looked to the factual evidence
that longwall mining was in use in the early days of the development of the coal industry. But the courts have gone a step
further. Even in those states which prohibit surface mining without additional compensation to surface owners when surface
mining would not have been in the original contemplation of
the parties, the courts have consistently refused to apply this
principle to longwall mining. Kentucky courts have always rejected the argument that mineral owners are restricted to mining
methods known at the time of the severance. 4 Kentucky has
consistently embraced the idea that mineral owners have virtually5
unlimited power to use newer mining methods to extract coal.
However, this longstanding and uninterrupted precedent was
challenged when Kentucky voters approved the Broad Form
Deed Amendment by more than an 80 percent margin in 1988.6
Essentially this amendment limits the extraction of minerals to
methods commonly known to be in use in Kentucky at the time
7
the instrument which severs the mineral estate was executed.
Although courts have not yet ruled on the constitutionality of
the amendment, scholars have raised serious questions about its
constitutionality. Concern has been expressed about whether the
amendment constitutes a taking of property without compensa-

Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987).
6 Lexington Herald-Leader, Nov. 9, 1988, at Al.
7 KY. CONST. § 19(2):
In any instrument heretofore or hereafter executed purporting to sever the
surface and mineral estates or to grant a mineral estate or to grant a right
to extract minerals, which fails to state or describe in express and specific
terms the method of coal extraction to be employed, or where said instrument contains language subordinating the surface estate to the mineral
estate, it shall be held, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary, that the intention of the parties to the instrument was that
the coal be extracted only by the method or methods of commercial coal
extraction commonly known to be in use in Kentucky in the area affected
at the time the instrument was executed, and that the mineral estate be
dominant to the surface estate for the purposes of coal extraction by only
the method or methods of commercial coal extraction commonly known
to be in use in Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument
was executed.
4
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tion in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments; whether
it violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and whether it impermissibly interferes with private contracts.8
CASES CHALLENGING SEVERANCE DEED WAIVERS IN INSTANCES
OF LONGWALL MINING

Four recent cases in three jurisdictions have adopted an
emerging rule that the mineral estate owner using the longwall
mining method is not liable for damages in cases where the
surface owner waived his right to subjacent support. Longwall
mining is a method where all coal is extracted along a long,
continuous working face. The more common method is known
as "room and pillar" in which large blocks of coal are spaced
throughout the mine to support the roof.9 The most recent case
challenging the longwall mining method is Ball v. Island Creek
Coal Co.'0 In that case the plaintiffs complained that the defendant's use of longwall mining on his property caused vibrations,
seismic shocks and subsidence. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged
that Island Creek's mining released quantities of methane gas
which resulted in three gas fires spontaneously igniting on the
surface of the land. One plaintiff alleged that his home and
dairy building were destroyed by a gas fire that ignited because
of Island Creek's mining."
The plaintiffs asked for relief on a number of grounds. They
alleged that the damage to their property was due to defendant's
negligence, or that the defendants were strictly liable and sought
recovery for mental pain and anguish. In addition, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant's mining constituted a nuisance and
violated a Virginia statute that allows a person to recover damages in instances where a coal operator violates mining regulations.' 2 Island Creek moved for summary judgment on grounds
that the plaintiff had waived his right to subjacent support,
effectively waiving any claim for damages. 3

I See, e.g., Bratt and Greenwell, Kentucky's Broad Form Deed Amendment:
Constitutional Considerations, 5 J. MiN. L. & PoL'Y 9 (1989).
Culp v. Consolidated Pa. Coal Co., No. 8193 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 1989).
Ball v. Island Creek Coal Co., 722 F. Supp. 1370 (W.D. Va. 1989).
Id. at 1371.
12 Id.
1 Ball, 722 F. Supp at 1371.
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The court granted Island Creek's motion for a summary
judgment. 4 First, the court found that a waiver of the right to
subjacent support is effective if it is made in "clear and unequivocal language." This standard was established in Virginia in
Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton." The court noted in dictum
that Virginia courts would consider an exception to this general
rule in instances in which the contemplated use of the surface is
6
in conflict with the waiver of that right.'
The plaintiffs argued that even if the waiver were upheld, it
should not be enforced with regard to longwall mining because
the parties to the original agreement could not have foreseen the
existence of the longwall method. The court accepted this argument as factually accurate, but rejected the notion that precedents restricting surface mining under a similar argument would
apply. 7 The court distinguished surface mining as a different
type of mining than those types contemplated at the turn of the
century, when the original deed severances were executed. Longwall mining, the court said, is the same type of mining as other
underground mining techniques.
Modern longwall mining is different from the underground
mining techniques available when the severance deeds were
executed in the degree of damage, and not the kind of damage,
it causes to the surface. Thus, neither the use of modern
longwall mining nor the use of any other underground mining
technique requires the existence of the right to destroy the
surface as the use of strip mining does. Therefore, whether the
parties to a deed contemplating the use of underground mining
contemplated the use of a particular underground mining technique is irrelevant in regards to the permissibility of the use
of that technique.' 8
Finally, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish
that the property damage they complained of was caused by loss

14

Id. at 1376.

'

89 S.E. 305, 311 (1916).

16

1970).

The court relied on Mullins v. Beatrice Pocohontas Co., 432 F.2d 314 (4th Cir.

'7 Virginia recognizes the right of surface owners to limit surface mining. This
right has been upheld on the grounds that the original parties could not have contemplated removing coal by means other than underground mining. Even in cases where the
deed specified that the mineral owner could remove coal without liability for injury to
the surface, the Virginia Supreme Court has held that the parties contemplated only
underground mining. Phipps v. Leftwick, 222 S.E.2d 536 (1976).
11Ball, 722 F. Supp. at 1373.
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of subjacent support. According to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 9 the party requesting a summary judgment
is required to meet a burden of production. Island Creek met
this burden by providing affidavits from a real estate attorney
showing that the waivers of subjacent support were contained in
the original severance deeds. Having met that burden, the plaintiffs were required to make an affirmative showing to refute
Island Creek's claim. The court found that the plaintiffs' affidavit that longwall mining was unknown when the severance
was made in 1907 was insufficient to demonstrate the real issue:
that the plaintiffs' damages were caused by loss of subjacent
support. Failing such proof, no genuine issue of material fact
remained 2° and a summary judgment was appropriate. 2'
An argument similar to the one raised in Ball was addressed
in Culp v. Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co.22 Culp raises a slightly
different twist on Ball's argument. In Culp, the mineral severance was only for the Pittsburgh seam of coal. 23 Culp sued not
only for surface damages, but also for damages to coal seams
overlying Consol's Pittsburgh seam.Y The plaintiffs' allegations
involved 55 deeds with 10 variations in wording, but the court
found that all the versions had the effect of waiving the right
25
to subjacent support.
Culp argued that the common law right to subjacent support
was not waived in some of the severances; that support but not
damages had been waived with regard to some of the lands and
that Consol could not employ the longwall method of mining.
Consol, relying on an argument similar to the one raised by
Island Creek Coal in Ball, asked for a summary judgment based
on the deed language which waived the right to subjacent support
and therefore the right to recover damages for the removal of
support. The waiver, Consol said, applied to longwall mining as
well as to room and pillar mining. 26
11FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
1o FED. R. Cirv. P. 56(e).
21 Ball, 722 F. Supp. at 1375.
n Culp v. Consol Pa. Coal Co., No. 8193 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 1989).
The Culps owned all the surface and all subsurface estates including the coal
seams known as the Sewickley and Waynesburg seams, except for the Pittsburgh seam
which was owned by the defendant Consol. Id. at 18.
2
Culp v. Consol Pa. Coal Co., No. 8193 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 1989).
2 Id. at 3.
Id. at 4, citing Chartiers Black Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 296, 25 A.
597, 598 (1893).
23
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The court began its analysis by noting that Pennsylvania law

supported the stratification of property interests. 27 Pennsylvania
courts have also upheld the right to waive subjacent support if
the language of the waiver is clear. 8 Because the right to subjacent support is a separate interest in land, and the right to
damages for removal of support depends on the ownership of

the support estate, 29 then even if the waiver did not refer specifically to liability or damages, the general notion of a waiver
would encompass such ideas.3 0

Interestingly, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a law designed to protect surface structures from mine subsidence. 3'
However, the courts have strictly construed this statute to apply
only to protection of the surface estate. 32 The overlying strata
would be protected only to the extent the surface estate was
endangered.
Therefore, the court concluded that Culp's predecessors in
title waived their right to subjacent support. Culp contended
that even if such a waiver had been made, longwall mining
should be prohibited because such a method was beyond the
contemplation of the parties at the time of the waiver. In contrast to Ball, the Culp court looked to factual evidence to
determine whether the longwall mining method was known at
the time of the waiver, and found that longwall mining had been
used in Pennsylvania and throughout the world for more than
a century. However, even if the Culp court found thit the
longwall method was unknown at the time of the deed waiver,
the court would have allowed the longwall method to be used
in this instance because the language of the conveyance was clear
and unambiguous. 3 Consol's deed provided for the right to

" Culp, No. 8193 at 5, citing Charnetski v. Miners Mills Coal Mining Co., 113
A. 683 (1921), Atherton v. Clearview Coal Co., 110 A. 298 (1920), Commonwealth v.
Clearview Coal Co., 100 A. 820 (1917); Miles v. Pa. Coal Co., 63 A. 1032 (1906) and
Madden v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 61 A. 559 (1905).
Culp, No. 8193 at 5.
Id. at 6.
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 72 A.2d 568 (Pa. 1950).
s1 Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, 52 PA. CoNs. STAT.

§§ 1406- (19).
32 Culp v. Consol Pa. Coal Co., No. 8193 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 1989). The court
relies on Culp v. Consol Pa. Coal Co., 506 A.2d 985 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1986) and George

v. Commonwealth, Department of Environmental Resources, 517 A.2d 578 (Pa. Comm.
Ct. 1986) for authority~on this point.
" Culp, No. 8193 at 9.
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remove all the coal from the Pittsburgh seam without regard to
support:
The plaintiffs' argument does not serve to clarify an amgibuity
with the deeds rather, it attempts to inject ambiguity where
none exists. They contend that the grantor did not really mean
all coal, only part of it. Had the grantors wished to prevent
removal of 'all' of the coal or to require leaving 'any' support
for overlaying strata, this easily could have been accomplished.
Instead, the deeds used language uniquely and powerfully op34
posed to any such inference.

Like the Virginia court in Ball, the Pennsylvania court refused to analogize longwall mining with surface mining. Pennsylvania's seminal case with regard to surface mining is Stewart
v. Chernicky.35 In that case, language of the severance clearly
contemplated underground mining. Because the language peculiarly applied to underground mining, the court refused to extend
those rights to surface mining. Echoing language similar to that
used in Ball, the court distinguished strip mining as a different
type of mining than deep mining. Because the references to
procedures such as ventilation in the severance deed are unique
to deep mining, and the court concluded that the parties could
36
not have contemplated surface mining.
Finally, the court noted that its decision was consistent with
two other recent decisions in Pennsylvania and Ohio. In Porter
v. Consolidation Coal Company, Inc., 7 the court upheld the
notion that when deeds are not ambiguous but clearly convey a
mineral estate in which the more common room and pillar
mining would have been permitted, longwall mining must also
be permitted. 8 Faced with facts essentially the same as those in
Culp, the court refused to apply case law principles adopted in
strip mining to longwall mining, rejecting the idea that longwall
mining is a novel mining technique. 9
Faced with a nearly identical situation in Wells v. American
Electric Power Co.,4 the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the
Culp v. Consol Pa. Coal Co., No. 87-1688 at 9.,
Stewart v. Chernicky, 266 A.2d 259 (1970).
Culp, No. 87-1688 at 9, 10.
11 Porter v. Consolidation Coal Co., Inc., Civ. No. 86-1396, (W.D. Pa), aff'd,
870 F.2d 651 (3rd Cir. 1989).
" Id. at 3.
39 Id.
10 Wells v. American Elec. Power Co., No. 441, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. July 29,
1988).
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defendant's motion for summary judgment. Ohio case law supports an assumption that the surface owner has an absolute right
to subjacent support . 4 However, Ohio has long acknowledged
that such a right may be waived.4 2 The existence of such a waiver
turns on the clear language of the conveyance. In Wells v.
American Electric Power Co., the court held, "If the grantee of
the mineral estate is liable for all damages, and if the grantor
waives all damages, it cannot be contended that the language of
the contract is unclear. All means all."" The Wells court notes
the irony of the plaintiffs' position, which would allow damages
not
due to subsidence caused by longwall mining, but would
45
allow subsidence damages due to room and pillar mining.
DEED WAIVERS UNDER KENTUCKY LAW

Kentucky, with its long history of mining, has established
some unique features with regard to the rights of mineral estate
owners as they pertain to surface estate owners. Surface and
mineral rights can be separated into legally distinct estates in
land. 6 Severance can be achieved either by lease or by a fee
simple title to the minerals. Such separate estates can also be
created by sale of the surface, with a reservation of the minerals
by the grantor.4 7 The mineral estate is considered the dominant
estate and the surface estate is the subservient estate.48
Some of the early conveyances severing mineral from surface
estates were in the form of a broad form deed.4 9 The broad
form deed, common at the turn of the century, generally had
three unique features. First, all minerals Were conveyed to the
grantee. Second, such a deed contained a grant of surface rights
that the mineral owner deems "necessary or convenient" for the

4
Ohio's absolute right to subjacent support is expressed in Ohio Collieries v.
Cooke, 107 Ohio St. 238 (1923).
42 Burgner v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 340 (1881)
(right of the surface owner to
waive such a right).
4, Wells v. American Elec. Power Co., No. 441, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. July 29,
1988).
. Id. at 5.
4,Id. at 6.
-' See Kinkaid v. McGowan, 4 W.W. 802 (1887) and Duncan v. Mason, 239 Ky.
570 (19).
41 VuH, CoAL LAW AN REoutAToN § 80.02 (1983).
" Mclntire v. Marian Coal Co., 227 S.W. 298 (Ky. 1921).
" See Pfeiffer, Kentucky's New Broad Form Deed Law-Is It Constitutional? 1
J. MiN. L. & POL'Y 57-60 (1985).

1990-91]

WAIVERS OF SUPPORT FOR LONGWALL Mn-INO

317

enjoyment of the mineral estate. Third, broad form deeds typically contain an express waiver of liability for damages caused
by mining operation.10
The grantor may specifically reserve agricultural uses when
the mineral rights are conveyed. However, Kentucky courts have
decided that a mineral grantee may use as much of the surface
as it deems necessary or convenient to its mining business, including use and occupancy of the entire surface, even that occupied by the surface owner's house and garden not withstanding
such a reservation." However, the Mclntire court added satisfaction or adjudged compensation for such improvements had
to have been made before any taking of the improvements is
allowed. 5 2 Additionally, the injured surface owner can recover
damage awards from the surface estate owner. 53

The mineral owners' use of the surface was limited to uses
which were not oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious.' 4 As
if to demonstrate just how narrow the limitations on mineral
owners were, the court allowed a mineral estate owner in Wells
v. North East Coal Co." to build a railway across the surface
even though all the coal conveyed had been mined.
By 1930 the court recognized rights of mineral owners to use
methods of mining other than room and pillar mining. In Rudd

v. Hayden 6 the mineral owner was granted the right to use the
surface for methods which may include open cut, strip or hymining of coal was predraulic methods of mining.' 7 Surface
5
sented in Treadway v. Wilson.
Surface mining techniques were permitted under the rationale
of dominance of the mineral estate with the limitation that the
mineral owner's conduct not be oppressive, arbitrary, wanton
or malicious. 59 The Kentucky Supreme Court relied on the precedent and the language presented in Case.60
Bratt and Greenwell, supra note 8, at 12.
, Mclntire v. Marian Coal Co., 227 S.W. 300 (Ky. 1921).
I2 at 300.
id.
SO

" Id.

Case v. Elk Horn Coal Corp., 210 Ky. 700 (1925).
255 Ky. 62 (1934).

265 Ky. 495 (1930).

"

(1925).

Id. at 499.
192 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1946).
Id. at 950.
Treadway, 192 S.W.2d at 950, citing Case v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 210 Ky. 700
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Kentucky courts have also insisted on interpreting contracts
from the plain language of the conveyance itself. Extrinsic evidence is not admissible except where the language of the instru6
ment is "ambiguous or obscure". '
These cases set the stage for a direct challenge to the mineral
owner's right to take coal by surface mining. In 1956 the Kentucky Supreme Court faced such a challenge in Buchanan v.
Watson.62 The court issued one opinion, then withdrew it and
replaced it with a second opinion.6 3 The first Buchanan opinion
said that in cases where parties would not have contemplated
surface mining, a mineral owner would have to pay reasonable
compensation as damages to the extent the mineral owner destroys in the strip mining process the surface owner's interest in
surface and timber."
The second Buchanan opinion took the opposite tack. The
court reasoned that strip and auger methods were known at the
time of the conveyance and were not specifically excluded. 65 To
deny a mineral owner the right to remove coal by the only
feasible process available, surface mining, would defeat the express purpose of the deed. The Buchanan court held that the
waiver of damages clause could not be questioned." Finally, the
court said the right of the mineral estate to use the surface was
a firmly ingrained rule of property in Kentucky and to reverse
it would create "great confusion and much hardship in a segment
of an industry that can ill-afford such a blow.""6
Since Buchanan Kentucky courts have continued to enforce
the dominance of the mineral owner's right to conduct surface
mining despite destruction of the surface owner's land. 67 The
Blue Diamond court held that the mineral owner is entitled to
a directed verdict on the subject unless its right to mine was
exercised in an oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious manner." Mineral owners were not required to use underground
o,

Gibson v. Sellars, 252 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1952).
290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).

63In Buchanan v. Watson, the original slip opinion was rendered on September
30, 1955, withdrawn, modified and published at 290 S.W.2d 40. The second-and finalopinion was rendered on May 4, 1956.
- Buchanan v. Watson, orig. slip op., 3-4, cited in Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d
294 (Ky. 1987).
61Buchanan, 290 S.W.2d at 42.

Id. at 43.
Buchanan, 290 S.W.2d at 43-44.
67Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1960).
"Id.
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mining even if it were just as practical and would not destroy
the surface; the surface can be destroyed by a mineral holder
even if another method was practical. 69
However, some limitations to this right of use have been
acknowledged. Dumping mine waste from another mine on a
surface owner's property was judged an oppressive, arbitrary
wanton or malicious act and was not permitted.7 0 The virtually
unlimited rights of the mineral owners to use and destroy the
surface estate were restricted to those estates conveyed by broad
7
form deeds. '
Despite the courts' enforcement of the legality of surface
mining under broad form deeds, the U.S. Congress, acting on
negative public opinion of surface mining, enacted a sweeping
mine reclamation law in 1977.72 Kentuckians who opposed surface mining were not satisfied with the new reclamation law,
and thus persuaded the Kentucky General Assembly to enact the
Mineral Deed Act in 1984. 73 The Mineral Deed Act received its
74
first and last challenge in Akers v. Baldwin.
Akers filed suit to prevent Baldwin from issuing surface
mining permits where the right to strip mine was claimed under
an instrument which severed the minerals and the surface did
not specifically give the mineral owner the right to mine in such
a manner, and where the surface owner objected to or did not
consent to such method of mining."1 Falcon Coal challenged the
applicability and constitutionality of the Mineral Deed Act. The
Kentucky Supreme Court held that mineral owner under broad
form deed must pay damages to surface owner to compensate
for injury to surface as result of removal of minerals.76 The
court overruled the holding in Buchanan that upholds the waiver
of damages provision in broad form deeds. The Akers court
said this doctrine leads to the total destruction of surface without
compensation to the surface owner. 7" The court created a win-

" Kodak Coal Co. v. Smith, 338 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1960).
10 Croley v. Round Mountain Coal Co., 374 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1964).
Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1976).
72 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. of 1977 [hereinafter SMCRA]

Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988)).
13 Ky.
Ray. STAT. ANN. § 381.930-945 (Bobbs-Merrill)(1990 Supp.)[hereinafter
KRS].
'. 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987).
71 Id. at 296.
76 Id. at 305-306.
" Id. at 306.
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dow of May 4, 1956 and July 2, 1987. Conveyances made
between those dates are excluded from the ruling as are all broad
78
form deeds .
Akers then held that the Mineral Deed Act unconstitutionally
infringed on judicial power. 9 This Act requires a court to find
that the parties to a deed intend coal to be mined by methods
commonly known in area at time of execution of deed, unless
the deed specifically describes the method to be employed.
The court found that the Act was flawed for three reasons.
First, it interfered with judicial power to interpret past transactions under separation of powers doctrine.8 " Second, because the
Act functioned retroactively to determine the meaning of a preexisting deed or lease, it was constitutionally impermissible because such a function impairs the obligation of contract. Third,
the Act was flawed because although the General Assembly can
specify prospectively what rights are granted or denied by use
of certain language in contracts written in the future, it is
without power to affect vested property rights.8 '
KENTUCKY'S BROAD

FORM

DEED AMENDMENT

After the Akers opinion, opponents of surface mining decided to take an even more aggressive measure by proposing an
amendment to Kentucky's constitution which would limit mining
methods used to those known at the time of the conveyance of
the mineral estate if the method of mining was not specified in
the instrument creating the conveyance. 2 This amendment, approved by 83 percent of the voters in 1988, has yet to be tested
in Kentucky's courts.83 Yet some commentators have already
questioned whether the amendment can survive a challenge on
grounds of unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation, impermissible interference with private contracts and
violation of due process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution.8
" Id. at 307.
" Id. at 310.
0Id. at 309, citing Legislative Research Commission v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 904,
911-914 (Ky. 1984)
Akers, 756 S.W.2d at 310.
Ky. CoNST. § 19 (2).
Preference Primary" published by the Office of
83 According to "Presidential
Bremer Ehrler, Secretary of State on March 8, 1989, the vote was 882,960 for and
187,119 against.
" Bratt and Greenwell, supra note 8, at 11.
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Carolyn Bratt and Karen Greenwell, writing for the Journal
of Mineral Law and Policy, concluded that Kentucky's Broad
Form Deed amendment violates the fifth amendment's prohibition against the taking of private property for public use without
compensation."
The pre-Amendment right of a Kentucky mineral owner under
a broad form deed to mine coal by later developed mining
methods is a property right created by state law and protected
by the fifth amendment. The Amendment does not further a
valid public interest. Its real purpose is to achieve the constitutionally impermissible objective of changing the economic
bargaining positions of the surface and mineral owners by
of contracts entered into at the
mandating the reinterpretation
86
turn-of-the-century.
The fifth amendment also protects a property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations. 8" Those mineral owners
who have come to rely on nearly 100 years of Kentucky law
have a state-created and constitutionally protected property interest: that a mineral owner can employ modern mining methods
88
to extract its coal.
Bratt and Greenwell argue that the Broad Form Deed
Amendment violates the contracts clause of the United States
Constitution, defying the express intent of the parties to private
contracts . 9 State law is rarely overturned on a contracts clause
argument, yet the wording of most broad form deeds allow the
mineral owner to use the surface of the mineral property for all
purposes "necessary or convenient" to mining. The Broad Form
Deed Amendment would impair that right. 9°
Plaintiffs might argue that such a violation might be excused
for a valid exercise of the state's police power. Bratt and Greenwell reject the idea that the Amendment is a valid exercise of
police power because it does not serve a general public purpose.
Because the Amendment provides that surface owners can waive
its provisions, any supposed public purpose is undermined. 9

0 Id.

at 89.
"Id. (Emphasis added).
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
"
Bratt and Greenwell, supra note 8, at 90.
Id. at 66-70.
Id.
I0 at 67.
91Id.
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Finally, Bratt and Greenwell entertain the idea that the Amendment violates the guarantees to equal protection and due process
found in the fifth and fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. 92 They admit that esoteric arguments based
on such claims might be made, but would probably not overcome
reluctance to overturn a
the United States Supreme Court's
93
state's constitutional amendment.
CONCLUSION

With longwall mining systems already installed in Harlan,
Letcher and Perry counties,9 the state's courts can expect to
encounter complaints from surface owner plaintiffs regarding
mine subsidence. But applying precedents from adjoining states
may be a problem for Kentucky courts for two reasons. First,
Kentucky courts have consistently and unequivocally enforced
the dominance of the mineral owner's estate through 70 years
of court opinions. Such a consistent line of decisions creates a
reasonable, investment-backed reliance by the purchasers of mineral estates. Such a reliance is constitutionally protected. 9
Buchanan has held that unless the mineral estate holder
mines in an oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious manner,
the courts will enforce an express damage waiver typical in broad
form deeds. 6 Current mineral owners have paid for the right to
extract mineral, and that right has been affirmed for decades by
the Kentucky courts.
The second problem in applying precedents from Culp and
Ball is that Kentucky's broad form deed waivers are unique in
their provision to the mineral estate owner of the right to use
the surface of the mineral property for all purposes necessary
or convenient to mining, transporting or preparing coal removed
from that property. 97 Pennsylvania, Virginia and Ohio courts
were not willing to add surface mining to the bundle of rights
under early severance deeds because the deeds clearly referred
to underground mining and made no reference to the mineral
estate owner's use of the surface.

"

"

U.S. CONST. AmEND. V and XIV.
Bratt and Greenwell, supra note 8, at 91.
Lexington Herald-Leader, Aug. 15, 1990, at B3.
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S., 499 (1987).
Buchanan, 290 S.W.2d at 43.
Akers, 736 S.W.2d 294.
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In Culp and Ball, the courts insisted on relying on the plain
language of the conveyance. Kentucky has also adopted such a
rule. 9 But applying the same rule in Kentucky would yield the
opposite result: it would allow for surface damage due to mine
subsidence from longwall mining just as it would for surface
mining.
The Broad Form Deed Amendment, if enforceable, would
prohibit such uses by its express language. But if surface owners
began insisting that all mineral owners use only the methods of
extraction which were in use at the time of the conveyance,
almost all contemporary mining techniques would be prohibited.
"Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the
Amendment prohibits mineral extraction by surface mining, augering, long wall mining, and continuous seam mining since
those techniques were developed well after most broad form
deeds were executed."99
Such a profound upheaval in mineral owners' reasonable
expectation that longwall mining is allowable would almost certainly provoke a challenge to the Broad Form Deed Amendment.
The question would then become: how easily can the Broad
Form Deed Amendment survive a constitutional challenge based
on the "takings" clause of the U.S. Constitution?
Bratt and Greenwell point out that it is impossible to argue
that the Broad Form Deed amendment serves a public purpose
when the surface owner himself can permit mining, ostensibly if
he is paid enough to persuade him to do so. But this contingency
in the Amendment is clearly a distinctive feature of private
property ownership. If the mineral estate is private property,
Bratt and Greenwell are skeptical that the Broad Form Deed
Amendment can survive a "takings" clause challenge.
Judy Jones Lewis

" Gibson v. Sellars, 252 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1952).

- Bratt and Greenwell, supra note 8, at 10 n.3.

